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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY V. GLENMONT HILLS ASSOCS.
PRIVACY WORLD: LANDLORDS WHO REFUSE
TENANTS SOLELY BECAUSE TENANTS INTEND TO USE
SECTION 8 VOUCHERS VIOLATE MONTGOMERY
COUNTY'S HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW,
REGARDLESS OF THE LANDLORD'S LACK OF INTENT TO
DISCRIMINATE.
By: Paul Lamari
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that refusing to accept a
tenant solely because the tenant intends to use section 8 vouchers for
the payment of rent is a form of "source of income" housing
discrimination. Montgomery County v. Glenmont Hills Assocs.
Privacy World, 402 Md. 250, 936 A.2d 325 (2007). A violation of
Montgomery County's anti-discrimination laws occurs regardless of a
landlord's lack of ill will toward low-income tenants, participation in
other affordable housing initiatives, "administrative burdens" on the
landlord, or the "voluntary" nature of the section 8 program under
federal statute. Id. at 278-79, 936 A.2d at 342.
Glenmont Hills Associates Privacy World at Glenmont Metro
Centre ("Glenmont"), a multi-unit apartment complex subject to
section 27-12 of the Montgomery County Code ("M.C.C. § 27-12"),
refused to lease an apartment to Ms. Walker, an otherwise qualified
tenant, who intended to use Federal Housing Choice Voucher Program
("section 8" or "FHCVP") vouchers for the partial payment of her rent.
Although Glenmont participated in other low-income housing
assistance programs, the complex refused to participate in the section
8 program because it felt that participation was too onerous. After it
was confirmed by a "tester" that Glenmont did not accept section 8
tenants, the Montgomery County Human Rights Commission
("Commission") filed a complaint against Glenmont with the Director
of the County Office of Human Rights. The Director found a violation
of Montgomery County's anti-discrimination laws.
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The Commission held that section 8 vouchers were "sources of
income" covered by M.C.C. § 27-12, and refusing otherwise qualified
tenants based solely on their intent to use the vouchers constituted a
"source of income" violation. Furthennore, the Commission
determined that "administrative burdens" for refusing section 8 tenants
were legally irrelevant, and that the county prohibition was not
preempted by Article I, Section 8, Clause I of the United States
Constitution ("Spending Clause") or the text of FHCVP, in which
landlord participation is voluntary.
On judicial review, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
reversed the Commission's decision, holding that although there was
no preemption by federal law, and the Montgomery County Council
clearly envisioned M.C.C. § 27-12 to include section 8 vouchers, the
county may not force landlords to enter into a contract with the federal
government. Additionally, the court found no violation because
Glenmont's decision to refuse section 8 tenants was based on a desire
to "avoid the administrative hassle," and lacked "the necessary
discriminatory animus." Montgomery County appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland, but prior to proceedings in that court,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari.
The Court disagreed with the Circuit court, reasoning that M.C.C. §
27-12 prohibits certain landlords from refusing to lease or rent housing
to any person based on their "source of income." Glenmont Hills, 402
Md. at 260, 936 A.2d at 330-31. Furthermore, the Court noted that the
term "source of income" includes "any lawful source of money, paid
directly or indirectly to a renter or buyer of housing." Id. at 260, 936
A.2d at 331. The Court found further support for its construction of
M.C.C. § 27-12 in the ordinance's legislative history, which expressly
included section 8 vouchers in the definition of "source of income."
Glenmont Hills, 402 Md. at 265-66,936 A.2d at 333-34.
Regarding Glenmont's claim of federal preemption, the Court
determined that M.C.C. § 27-12 is not preempted by the federal
provisions set forth by section 8. Glenmont Hills, 402 Md. at 273,936
A.2d at 338. The thrust of Glenmont's argument was that M.C.C. §
27-12 makes landlord participation in section 8 mandatory while the
text of section 8 itself envisions voluntary participation, thereby
creating a conflict. Glenmont Hills, 402 Md. at 268,936 A.2d at 336.
In rejecting this argument, the Court explained that for the preemption
doctrine to apply, absent an express congressional statement showing
intent to preempt state law or exclusively occupy a certain field, there
must be direct conflict between federal and state law. Id. at 267-68,
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936 A.2d at 334-35 (citing Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 377
Md. 197,832 A.2d 812 (2003».
Glenmont argued that voluntary participation in the section 8
program differs from the mandatory participation of M.C.C. § 27-12.
Glenmont Hills, 402 Md. at 268, 936 A.2d at 336. If that were the
case, then federal preemption would occur only if a landlord's ability
to participate in the section 8 program was Congress' primary purpose
in enacting section 8. Glenmont Hills, 402 Md. at 268-69,936 A.2d at
336. However, the Court observed that the only objective declared by
Congress was to "assist State and local governments in expanding
housing for low-income families," not to make landlord participation
in section 8 voluntary. Id. at 269, 936 A.2d at 336. Therefore,
preemption was not an issue. !d. at 273-74,936 A.2d at 339.
Glenmont also contended that because it accepted federal funds, the
Spending Clause required Montgomery County to keep participation
in section 8 voluntary. Glenmont Hills, 402 Md. at 273, 936 A.2d at
338-39.
The Court noted that Spending Clause legislation is
contractual in nature because States agree to comply with federallyimposed conditions in exchange for federal funds. Id. at 274, 936
A.2d at 339. Because of the contractual nature of the Spending
Clause, terms are only binding on the State if they are so unambiguous
that a "[s]tate official 'would clearly understand' the alleged
obligation" of the terms imposed by the Spending Clause. !d. at 274,
936 A.2d at 339 (quoting Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S.
Ct. 2455, 2459 (2006». Since nothing in section 8 imposed a
requirement of "voluntary participation," Montgomery County was not
required to make landlord participation voluntary. Glenmont Hills,
402 Md. at 275,936 A.2d at 339.
Finally, the Court discussed whether certain mandatory terms of
section 8 leases were so onerous that they constituted a defense to nonparticipation. Id. at 275-76, 936 A.2d at 339-40. While it recognized
that it may be possible for imposed requirements to interfere with
property rights, the court found that no such burden existed here. Id.
at 278, 936 A.2d at 341. The Court stated the Maryland rule that
unless the burden equals a "taking of property" or a violation of due
process, administrative burden is no defense. Id. at 278, 936 A.2d at
341-42. To that end, malevolent intent is not required to establish a
violation ofM.C.C. § 27-12. Glenmont Hills, 402 Md. at 278-79,936
A.2d at 342. The Court held that even though Glenmont's motivation
in refusal lacked "personal animus toward those prospective tenants,"
and the complex participated in other housing assistance programs, all
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that was required for a violation ofM.C.C. § 27-12 was for Glenmont
to have refused an otherwise qualified section 8 tenant. Glenmont
Hills, 402 Md. at 279,936 A.2d at 342.
By granting a writ of certiorari before proceedings had taken place
in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the Court is showing
how important this issue is to the property rights of landlords in
Maryland. As the Court's holding makes clear, local governments
may mandate participation in the section 8 voucher program, and
landlords who fall under the scope of county code provisions similar
to M.C.C. § 27-12 are not entitled to refuse qualified tenants simply
because they intend to pay rent with section 8 vouchers. Since the
vouchers were a "source of income" envisioned by the Montgomery
County Council, Glenmont's refusal to accept tenants based on section
8 status was a violation of law and a form of housing discrimination,
regardless of its lack of ill will.

